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The present study addresses effects of human redundancy on automation monitoring and cross-checking. 
Thirty-six participants performed a multi-task, consisting of three subtasks that mimic basic work demands 
of operators in a control room of a chemical plant. One of the tasks was to monitor and cross-check a high-
ly reliable and safety-critical automated process. Participants were randomly assigned to two groups: (1) 
“Non-redundant”: participants worked on all tasks alone as the only responsible operator. (2) “Redundant”: 
participants were informed that a second crewmate would work in parallel on the automation monitoring 
task and that they both were responsible for ensuring safe operation of the automation. Results provide 
evidence for social loafing effects in automation cross-checking. Participants working redundantly with 
another crewmate were found to cross-check the automation significantly less than participants, who were 
working alone. Even if the combined team performance of the participants working in the redundant condi-
tion was considered, the number of cross-checks did not significantly differ from the performance in the 
non-redundant condition. This result suggests that human redundancy can induce social loafing effects 
which fully compensate a possible reliability gain intended to be achieved by this measure. It challenges the 
often stated assumption that “four eyes see more than two” and shows that human redundancy does not 
necessarily lead to enhanced safety in automation monitoring. 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
In our industrialized society, fast data transmission, fast 
supply of energy, and fast transportation of goods and humans 
have become inevitable. Only with the help of highly special-
ized and complex technology and the cooperation of humans 
and machines, modern society is able to grow expeditiously. 
Technological inventions are pushing machines in various 
work fields to automate and amend human task fulfillment. 
Therefore in many fields humans are nowadays assisted by 
more or less complex technology.  
The remaining human responsibilities in interaction with 
highly automated systems have been characterized as supervi-
sory control (Sheridan & Parasuraman, 2005). In this concept 
the human tasks include constant monitoring and cross-
checking of fully automated systems, which work highly 
reliable (though often not perfect). In case the system reaches 
its capability limits, it is the human task to intervene by e.g. 
switching to manual operation.  
With the demand of monitoring and cross-checking auto-
mated systems, human attention and vigilance is challenged. 
As has often been stated, humans principally are not very well 
suited for monitoring tasks and may suffer from decrements of 
vigilance over time (Mackworth, 1948). Another issue often 
mentioned in this context is the issue of complacency. Com-
placency has been defined as a sort of substandard automation 
monitoring which, as a performance consequence can lead to 
poorer detection of system malfunctions under automation 
control compared with manual control (Parasuraman & Man-
zey, 2010). It represents a risk factor specifically when hu-
mans have to supervise a highly reliable system (Parasuraman, 
Molloy & Singh, 1993). Parasuraman and Manzey (2010) 
believe that complacency manifests itself in a malevolved 
attention allocation strategy (e.g. reduced cross-checking 
behavior) which results from a learning process in interaction 
with highly reliable systems referred to as learned careless-
ness (Luedtke & Moebus, 2005). Both, a vigilance decrement 
as well as complacency effects can cause a loss of situation 
awareness in interaction with an automated system. In case of 
automation failures, a reduced situation awareness, in turn, can 
lead to errors of commission (following automation directive 
although it is false) or errors of omission (failure to respond to 
system irregularities or events when automated devices fail to 
detect or indicate them) (Skitka, Mosier, Burdick & Rosen-
blatt, 2000). Because of its safety-relevance in all domains 
where human operators have the role of supervising control-
lers of automated processes, countermeasures have to be taken 
to mitigate the risks arising from vigilance decrements and/or 
complacency effects. 
One specific countermeasure, particularly recommended 
for use in safety-critical organizations (e.g. nuclear power 
plant, chemical plant, airplane), is raising the number of per-
sons, who monitor and cross-check the automated system. 
This principal is called redundancy and has been used for a 
long time as an engineering tool to enhance the overall relia-
bility and safety of technical systems. Redundancy theory 
demonstrates that the implementation of redundant technical 
components, if independent and connected in parallel manner, 
can lead to rapid increases in overall system reliability (Sagan, 
2004). For example, if the probability of a failure for one 
single component is 1/10, it is already reduced to (1/10)² if 
two independent components are redundantly used and (1/10)³ 
when a third redundant component is added. Many security 
analysts have, therefore, advised the widespread deployment 
of redundancy as a key requirement of high reliability organi-
zations (HRO). However, in case of the so called human re-
dundancy the relation between redundant components, i.e. 
redundantly working operators and safety enhancement is not 
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as straightforward as it is in purely technical redundant sys-
tems (Clark, 2005; Conte & Jacobs, 1997). The awareness of 
each other and the knowledge of the task being accomplished 
multiple times violate the precondition of component inde-
pendence. As a consequence, individuals may reduce their 
individual effort - an effect that is well documented and 
termed social loafing in social psychology (Latané, Williams 
& Harkins, 1997). Karau and Williams (1993) believe that 
individuals start loafing because they are only willing to exert 
effort on a collective task to the degree that they expect their 
efforts to be instrumental in obtaining valued outcomes. One-
hundred percent reliable automation cross-checking is possible 
in most cases with only one motivated and diligent person. 
Having this in the back of one’s mind, individuals may reduce 
automation monitoring if this task is performed collectively 
compared to situations where only one person is in charge of 
the task. Sagan (2004) even supposed that introducing human 
redundancy in complex technological facilities might actually 
raise safety issues instead of lowering them. He displayed that 
when the reliability of each new person in a redundant system 
leads to a reduction of the individual reliability due to social 
loafing effects by about 15%, the overall team reliability theo-
retically will improve for redundant crews of two or three 
operators but starts to decline and to become less than the 
reliability of a non-redundant single-operator system if the 
crew of operators becomes larger. 
Thus, a thorough investigation of possible social loafing 
effects in a redundantly performed cross-checking task is 
necessary before recommending human redundancy as a de-
sign element that mitigates reduced cross-checking due to 
complacency and/or vigilance decrement.  
The present study addresses this issue and extends the re-
search from Skitka et al. (2000), Domeinski, Wagner, Schoe-
bel and Manzey (2007) as well as Manzey, Boehme and 
Schoebel (2013). Skitka et al. (2000) investigated whether the 
tendency towards errors of omission and commission were 
ameliorated when two instead of one single decision maker is 
monitoring system events. No difference between team per-
formance and solo performance was found with respect to 
committing commission or omission errors, suggesting that no 
safety gain might be achieved by human redundancy. Howev-
er, in this study no direct measures of individual monitoring 
behavior were taken which made any interpretation in terms of 
possible social loafing effects in the team condition difficult. 
Domeinski et al. (2007) and Manzey et al. (2013) compared 
the actual cross-checking behavior of participants who were 
believed to work alone or redundantly with another crew mate 
on an automation monitoring task which was part of a com-
plex multi-task environment. Individuals working in the re-
dundant condition were found to reduce the number of cross-
checks of the automation significantly, compared to individu-
als working alone. This also led to a higher risk of committing 
errors of omission for participants working in the redundant 
condition. Although these results provide clear evidence for 
social loafing effects on the individual level, they do not nec-
essarily challenge the concept and benefits of human redun-
dancy, as none of these studies directly compared the com-
bined team performance of redundant working dyads with the 
performance of single operators. Obvious ceiling effects in the 
condition where participants worked as single operators made 
any such evaluation difficult.  
Based on these considerations and using a multi-task envi-
ronment closely resembling the one used in previous research 
(e.g. Manzey et al., 2013), the present experiment addresses 
three different aspect. First, we wanted to replicate the earlier 
findings of social loafing effects in automation monitoring 
introduced by human redundancy. Second, we wanted to 
investigate to what extent social loafing effects are influenced 
by time-on-task. Third, and most important, we wanted to 
investigate whether the combined monitoring performance of 
a redundant dyad would still be better than the performance of 
a single person. This latter effect would provide strong argu-
ments for considering human redundancy an effective safety 
countermeasure for known issues in human-automation inter-
action even in case of social loafing effects. 
 
METHOD 
 
Participants 
 
The sample used for this study consisted of 36 participants 
of whom 35 were students (23 female), aged 20-29 years 
(mean age: 25.17 years). The participants had no prior experi-
ence with the task. They were compensated for their participa-
tion with 15 Euro or three student credit hours. 
 
Apparatus and Task 
 
For the present experiment a PC-based laboratory multi-
task environment was used (Multi-Task Operator Performance 
Simulation for Redundancy Research, M-TOPS-R). It features 
three subtasks which are designed to mimic basic work de-
mands of operators in a control room of a chemical plant. The 
user-interface is shown in Figure 1. 
Resource ordering task (ROT). This task is shown in the 
upper left and basically represents a mental arithmetic task. 
Participants are instructed to assure the availability of required 
chemicals in order to keep the chemical process running. For 
this purpose the actual and the set values of different catalysts 
are presented, each for only ten seconds. Participants have to 
calculate the differences and type them into the ordering field. 
To submit they have to click on the order icon. After an order 
has been sent or after the ten seconds have passed a new task 
is presented after an interval of two to five seconds. 
Coolant exchange task (CET). This task is displayed in the 
upper right. Participants have to exchange the fluids in two 
vessels of a cooling system. Thereto different valves have to 
be opened and closed in a defined sequence to drain used fluid 
(green fluid) and to refill the vessels with fresh fluid (blue 
fluid). The speed with which the vessels are filled and emptied 
varies to avoid highly routinized workflows. The minimal time 
for a complete exchange-cycle therefore ranges from 14 to 38 
seconds. 
Monitoring task (MOT). This task is displayed in the lower 
right. Participants here have supervisory control over a system 
that autonomously analyses and controls the processes in 
different reaction chambers. Participants receive information 
about the assumed current state of the reaction chamber (e.g. 
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“temperature high”; “process running”) and the action the 
automation wants to initiate accordingly (e.g. “reduction of 
temperature”; “no action needed”). Participants are made 
believe that the automation would work quite reliable but not 
perfect. Therefore automation performance needs to be cross-
checked. To do so participants are asked to verify the automa-
tion by double-checking the raw data of the simulated process 
(e.g. temperature, heat distribution, pressure, valve setting). To 
view each parameter’s raw data, participants have to left-click 
on the corresponding button. Each possible state in a given 
chamber is defined by two conditions. Therefore full automa-
tion verification always comprises the inspection of two dif-
ferent parameters. In case an automation failure is identified 
(e.g. indication of “temperature high” when temperature is in 
normal range), participants have to initiate manual control 
(left-click on “manual” icon) for the given chamber. If no 
cross-checking is initiated within five seconds, the current 
reaction chamber disappears and the next chamber occurs after 
two to five seconds. If a participant decides to cross-check the 
automation a time credit of three seconds is warranted for 
every parameter clicked upon. 
 
 
 
Figure 1. User interface of Multi-Task Operator Performance Simulation for 
Redundancy Research (M-TOPS-R). Upper left: resource ordering task 
(ROT); upper right: coolant exchange task (CET); lower right: monitoring 
task (MOT).  
 
Design 
 
For the present study a 2 (working condition) x 12 (block) 
mixed factorial design was used. The first factor working 
condition represented a between-subjects factor with the two 
levels defined as (1) non-redundant work and (2) redundant 
work. In the non-redundant working condition it was stated 
that the participants would work on all three tasks alone. In the 
redundant condition participants were instructed that they 
would be the only responsible operator for the coolant ex-
change (CET) and resource ordering task (ROT), but would 
handle the monitoring task (MOT) as part of a two-person 
crew, i.e. would perform this subtask redundantly with the 
crewmate sitting next to them. The instructions further ex-
plained that only their team performance would be evaluated, 
i.e., if one of them detected an automation error their partner 
wouldn’t be alerted to it but the trial would count as correctly 
checked for both of them. Participants were randomly as-
signed to one of these two conditions. 
The second experimental factor block represented a within-
subjects factor and was introduced to consider possible time-
on-task effects. This factor depicts the changes in performance 
over time for all tasks via 12 successive blocks, each consist-
ing of 12 monitoring trials (four minutes on average). The 
automation worked without a single failure in order to increase 
the participants’ trust and to replicate the very high reliability 
of most automated systems which can be assumed to induce 
processes of learned carelessness over time.  
 
Dependent variables 
 
All performance measures were derived from a participant-
specific log-file that recorded all actions done during the ex-
periment.  
The main focus of the experiment was to evaluate the ef-
fects of the experimental conditions on MOT performance on 
individual as well as on team level. Thereto two separate 
measures were considered, one to assess the individual moni-
toring performance in both, the non-redundant and redundant 
conditions, and one to assess the team monitoring performance 
in the redundant condition. 
Individual monitoring performance. In order to assess how 
carefully the individual participants verified the automated 
diagnoses by cross-checking the available raw data, the num-
ber of trials where the automation was fully cross-checked was 
computed for each individual in each condition and each 
block. Only events where participants accessed both parame-
ters necessary to cross-check a given diagnosis and action 
indicated by the automation for a given chamber were counted 
as “fully cross-checked”. A maximum of twelve cross-checks 
was possible per block. 
Team monitoring performance. To assess the automation 
monitoring and cross-checking performance on team level in 
the redundant condition, the number of full cross-checks per-
formed by the two-person teams was counted. For this pur-
pose, a trial was counted as a “full cross-check” trial when at 
least one of the two team members in the redundant working 
condition had cross-checked both parameters necessary to 
verify the diagnosis and the action indicated by the automa-
tion. As for individual participants, also teams could achieve a 
maximum of twelve cross-checks per block.  
Furthermore, subjective measures were collected to assure 
the effect of the experimental manipulation on participants’ 
perception and behavior. Therefore participants’ feelings of 
responsibility, liability and motivation, as well as their as-
sessment of their own and their partner’s performance were 
assessed using questionnaires. Participants indicated their 
agreement to the following statements on a 4-point Likert 
scale ranging from 1 = a little to 4 = very much: “I felt relia-
ble/liable/was motivated to do well at the [insert task]” and “I/ 
my partner performed well at [insert task]/ compared to me”. 
Lastly, the physical condition before and after the experiment 
was assessed with the Stanford Sleepiness Scale (Hoddes, 
Dement & Zarcone, 1972) as well as with one self-developed 
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item, “My current performance capability is at ______% of 
my maximum performance capability,” to ensure that no con-
founding effects existed.  
Finally, also performance measures for the two other sub-
tasks were collected but will not be reported here. 
 
Procedure 
 
Four working stations had been set up in pairs next to one 
another, divided by moveable walls to prevent gazes to the 
other workstations. Participants were further instructed to not 
talk to each other.  
At the beginning, participants filled out questionnaires 
about their demographics and current performance state (i.e. 
physical condition). Then, a general instruction to M-TOPS-R 
was provided, followed by a detailed written explanation of 
the three subtasks including the automation verification proce-
dure to be used in the MOT. Each task was trained separately 
first. A practice trial followed in which participants had to do 
all three tasks simultaneously for six minutes.  
The manipulation of the two working conditions was done 
with differing instructions. In the non-redundant condition 
participants were told that they would work on independent 
work stations. In the redundant conditions partners had been 
assigned from the instructor and were introduced to each other 
as being team partners at the beginning of the experiment. To 
further support the illusion that the participants in the redun-
dant condition were working in teams they had to wait for 
their partners to enter the IP-address of their work station into 
the system to be able to start the practice trial. After a short 
break, the practice trial was succeeded by the actual data col-
lection of the experimental task, which lasted about 48 
minutes (144 trials divided into 12 blocks á four minutes). No 
breaks were provided between the blocks, neither was the 
block structure made transparent for the participants. 
After the experiment participants were asked to fill out the 
final questionnaire and to state their current physical condi-
tion. The session concluded with a debriefing about the objec-
tives of the experiment and the faked redundant condition 
before participants received their compensation. 
 
RESULTS 
 
Manipulation Check and Subjective Data 
 
To assure that the experimental manipulation regarding the 
two working conditions, non-redundant and redundant, really 
worked, participants were asked to vote their agreement to the 
statement “I was solely responsible for the [insert task]” on a 
4-point Likert scale. For the MOT the agreement was 
supposed to be high in the non-redundant group and low in the 
redundant group. The results show that the manipulation can 
be considered successful, with participants rating their 
agreement higher (Mdn = 4) for the non-redundant condition 
than for the redundant condition (Mdn = 1.5). The difference 
between both groups was significant with UMOT = 63, p < .01.  
Furthermore, no significant difference between the two ex-
perimental groups emerged with regard to motivation, feeling 
of liability and subjective assessment of performance. 
Lastly, no obvious relationship between physical condition 
and performance was found. 
 
Performance Measures 
 
Individual monitoring performance. The number of com-
pletely performed cross-checks per block was considerably 
smaller in the redundant condition (M = 84.56) as in the non-
redundant one (M = 112.28). A 2 (working condition) x 12 
(block) ANOVA revealed a significant difference, 
F (1, 34) = 4.89, p = .03, ηp
2
 = .13. Because of violations of 
the sphericity assumption, degrees of freedom for the effect of 
block were corrected according to Greenhouse-Geisser. The 
analysis revealed a main effect for the factor block, 
F (7.15, 243.13) = 2.42, p = .02, ηp
2
 = .07, indicating that 
monitoring performance differed across the 12 blocks. In 
addition, a significant interaction effect working condition x 
block emerged, F (11, 374) = 2.79, p = .002, ηp
2
 = .08. As 
becomes evident from Figure 2, the mean number of full 
cross-checks slightly decreased over successive blocks for 
participants working with a partner (redundant: white circles), 
while the number of cross-checks slightly increased for the 
participants working alone (non-redundant: black circles). 
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Figure 2. Mean numbers and standard errors of full cross-checks in the 
monitoring task over 12 blocks. The non-redunant graph (black circles) shows 
the performance of the participants working alone, the redundant graph (white 
circles) depicts the performance of individual persons during the work with a 
team partner. 
 
Team monitoring performance. The data for the team per-
formance revealed that, summed across blocks, more full 
cross-checks in the monitoring task were performed by both 
team members taken together (M = 125.00) than by the partic-
ipants working alone (M = 112.28). This difference (team vs. 
non-redundant), however, failed to reach significance, 
F (1, 34) = 1.91, p = .18, ηp
2
 = .05. Because of violations of 
the sphericity assumption, degrees of freedom for the effect of 
the factor block were corrected according to Greenhouse-
Geisser. The analysis revealed a main effect for this factor, 
F (6.75, 229.63) = 3.52, p < .01, ηp
2
 = .1. In addition, a signifi-
cant interaction effect condition (team vs. non-redundant) x 
block emerged, F (11, 374) = 3.07, p < .01, ηp
2
 = .08. Figure 3 
shows that the redundant teams (white circles) outperformed 
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the non-redundant working participants (black circles) during 
the first two blocks. However, due to an increase of individual 
performance in the non-redundant condition, this benefit was 
largely reduced and almost vanished for the remaining blocks 
but block #9. 
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Figure 3. Mean numbers and standard errors of full cross-checks in the 
monitoring task over 12 blocks. The non-redundant graph (black circles) 
shows the performance of participants working alone and the team graph 
(white circles) the combined performance of two persons working in a team. 
 
DISCUSSION 
 
The results of the present experiment again create doubts 
on whether human redundancy is indeed a design element that 
can mitigate known risks of human automation monitoring. 
This can be concluded from three different findings: 
First, the result of the present experiment confirms earlier 
results reported by Domeinski et al. (2007) and Manzey et 
al. (2013), which indicate that individuals working redundant-
ly with a team partner on an automation monitoring task re-
duce their effort to cross-check the automation compared to 
participants working alone. This finding once again provides 
evidence for the risk of social loafing effects in redundant 
teams. 
Second, while the number of automation cross-checks 
slightly increased over blocks (i.e. time-on-task) for partici-
pants working in the non-redundant condition, possibly indi-
cating effects of learning and routinization, a slight decrease 
of individual performance was found in the redundant condi-
tion. This opposing trend further questions the safety gain of 
human redundancy in particular when redundant work condi-
tions persist over longer periods. In the present study partici-
pants worked on the multi-task only for 48 minutes. Therefore 
it should be further investigated whether the declining trend 
pursues with longer working times. 
Third, although a small advantage of combined team per-
formance as compared to individual performance was ob-
served on a descriptive level, the number of full cross-checks 
performed by teams was not significantly different from the 
performance of participants in the non-redundant condition. 
Thus the overall system reliability was not enhanced through 
redundant task completion. This confirms earlier results from 
studies of Skitka et al. (2000) and Mosier et al. (2001) who 
also did not find obvious performance benefits of teams com-
pared to individuals when considering the risk of commission 
and omission errors during the interaction with an automated 
system. Sagan (2004) predicted that even unreliable compo-
nents, if independent and parallel, lead to a rapid increase of 
overall system reliability when combined to redundant sys-
tems. Since humans working in teams are aware of each other 
the independence assumption is violated and the rapid increase 
in safety is uncertain. The present findings emphasize that 
social loafing effects in teams can largely compensate reliabil-
ity gains of human redundancy and, hence, render reliability of 
teams not considerably better than the reliability of a single 
person. As a consequence, the advice of safety experts to 
deploy redundancy as a key requirement of high reliability 
organizations (HRO) may be appropriate for technical compo-
nents, but questionable for the case of human redundancy. 
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